When Is It Wrong To Kill?

Yup, I've reached the chapter on "Killing" - euthanasia, abortion and infanticide in Singer's book, "Writings on an Ethical Life".

I was wrong to have mentioned initially that he shares opposing views to Harris on the ethics/philosophy. As I read on through the earlier chapters of his book, it dawned upon me that Singer's concept of practical ethics does not run faraway from Harris's concept of rational intuition.

For instance, Singer in the chapter entitled "When Is It Wrong To Kill" proceeds to address the following issues:

- The concept of personhood
- The moral justifications for killing (i.e. euthanasia, abortion and infanticide)

Both Singer and Harris proceed to address the concept of personhood, and then utilize their conception of "persons" in order to justify their arguments for killing.

They both begin with the same arguments. That the concept of personhood is determined by consciousness, ability to communicate and to express ourselves. But Harris in his book, "The Value of Life" goes on further to assert that one main quality that sets us apart as a more 'superior race' than animals is our ability of self-recognition. And I find this to be the pivotal point to the concept of personhood.

The basic 'criterias' as laid down above to establish personhood must be considered cumulatively. Firstly, consciousness as a pre-requisite is important, but not conclusive. It is important as it would justify the ethical arguments for euthanasia. Consciousness refers to our ability to be aware of our surroundings, and experience the ups and downs of life. Hence, often, when decisions are made to withdraw treatment from PVS (permanent vegetative state) patients, healthcare professionals, ethicists and more importantly the patient's family members resort to this argument; that Andrew is no longer conscious, and kept alive only by machines. He no longer has a chance of regaining consciousness again. Hence, it would be in his best interest to withdraw treatment. This is perhaps the ground taken by the courts in deciding in favour of withdrawal of treatment in the case of Tony Bland who was involved in the Hillsborough disaster in 1980s???.

But, this justification taken alone would not be sufficient to justify euthanasia. Animals are also conscious beings, so what makes us so special as humans? Why would it be morally tenable to kill a chicken for dinner tonight, but not to kill Jacob, our elderly next door neighbour instead?

This brings us to the next point - ability to communicate and of self-expression. Human beings are able to express their feelings, wants and needs by means of language. But, this alone would not be sufficient to establish our claim to the right to life as persons. Animals, likewise have their own means of communication and self expression. Sally the dog may bark when she is angry, growl when she is pissed and whimper when she is afraid of lightning. Buck the horse may neigh when it's read to mate. All these are forms of 'self-expression' and such ability to communicate is not solely confined to human beings.

I may speak English, him in Malay, her in French. But we're all persons. Hence, it can be seen that the fact that someone else does not speak a language than is understandable by others, it does not make the individual less human. So the two criteria of consciousness and communication are insufficient to justify arguments in favour of the ethical righteousness of euthanasia. I may speak in English and Bob the dog would not understand a single word I say, and similarly Bob may growl, grunt and bark and I would not understand a single 'word' it says too! Does this justify euthanasing Bob (on assumption that it ends up in a PVS stage one day) merely on the basis that it speaks 'alien language'? Well, English, Malay and French may be 'alien' to Bob too! But we're both able to express ourselves in a language only we understand. Hence, criteria for personhood number 2 does not justify an overriding interest in favour of humans.

At this point, Harris makes this pivotal point. In that our ability of self-recognition and self-awareness makes us humans. We have a concept of 'self' and as such, it would be wrong to do anything in violation of our conception of our individualism. Put a baby in front of the mirror, and it would be able to recognise him/herself. In contrast, put a tiger in front of the mirror and it'll probably ram through it, shattering the mirror into pieces.

Therefore, I am of the opinion that this, would amount to the cut-off point in the determination of personhood and to justify killing.

As persons, they would have the concept of 'self' and as PVS patient's lack this general conception of 'self', it would be morally euthanise them. The lack of 'personhood' in them renders it morally tenable to euthanise as they are no longer able to live life as they desire. As they lack the requisite concepts of personhood, euthanasia cannot be equated to killing. It should instead be viewed as means to ease the passing of a 'former person'. This was the ratio behind the decision in the Bland case in which the judges held that, (in my own words)

"...Tony is no longer the boy he used to be. What he is now is a shadow of his former self and as such, it would be in his best interests to withdraw treatment..."

This is true as one who is not a "person" would be no longer have the ability to value their existence. And as such, euthanasia does not amount to a violation of their purported human rights. Therefore, killing is morally and ethically tenable.

This would perhaps explain the morality behind killing Sam the chicken for dinner instead of Roger your next door neighbour.

I certainly hope that I would not be put into any such position in the future as I readily admit that I am sure that my considerations would be very very different.

Some things are easier laid down in theory than in practice.

-LV-